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Introduction 
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Roberts Court’s approach 
to personal jurisdiction is that it has an approach at all. For nearly 
twenty-five years, the Supreme Court declined to hear any personal 
jurisdiction cases.1 Nonetheless, personal jurisdiction issues continued 
to be litigated. As a result, personal jurisdiction doctrine developed in 
the circuit courts of appeals and in the state supreme courts, and these 
courts developed a relatively coherent body of law, albeit with circuit 
splits on some significant issues.2 After decades of avoiding personal 
 
†  Cassandra Burke Robertson is Professor of Law, Laura B. Chisolm 
Distinguished Research Scholar, and Director of the Center for Professional 
Ethics, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
††  Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes is Vinson & Elkins Research Professor and 
Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston. 
1. Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful Availment, 45 Conn. 
L. Rev. 41, 43 (2012) (“Prior to the two personal jurisdiction cases that the 
Supreme Court promulgated in 2011, it had been nearly twenty-five years 
since the Supreme Court last considered whether a state court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has no physical pre-
sence in the forum jurisdiction.”). 
2. See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure 
Revival, 31 Rev. Litig. 313, 317 (2012) (noting that “Justice David Souter 
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jurisdiction cases, the Supreme Court issued four opinions addressing 
the law of personal jurisdiction within three years.3 These opinions sig-
nificantly changed the shape of personal jurisdiction doctrine, leading 
to a rebalancing of the jurisdictional equilibrium—a balance whose 
center is still not fully known, as courts struggle to fit cases into the 
new framework set out by the Supreme Court.4 
In this Article, we analyze how the Roberts Court’s approach to 
personal jurisdiction affects business and commercial interests. First, 
we explain how the Roberts Court reshaped the doctrine of personal 
jurisdiction, narrowing jurisdictional bases in some areas while leaving 
other issues open for future litigation and ultimately crafting a new 
equilibrium in jurisdictional doctrine. Next, we examine the guiding 
principles underlying the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases. We find 
little evidence that the Court was motivated by a desire to favor 
business interests—the Court failed to resolve the major question that 
 
joined the Court in the fall of 1990 (five months after Burnham) and served 
for nineteen years, but he never decided a personal jurisdiction case, despite 
occasional explicit requests from lower-court judges for the Supreme Court 
to provide some definitive answers to lingering questions”) (citing Luv N’ 
Care, Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 474–76 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, 
J., specially concurring) (“urg[ing] the Supreme Court to resolve” a split 
regarding stream-of-commerce jurisdiction)). For an analysis of the pre-
Roberts Court doctrine, see Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability 
Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a 
“Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach to Minimum 
Contacts, 57 Baylor L. Rev. 135, 201–11 (2005) and Linda Sandstrom 
Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profiles for Specific Jurisdiction, 38 Ind. 
L. Rev. 343, 348–73 (2005). 
3. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014) (holding that the defendant lacked 
the minimum contacts with the forum state needed to satisfy the pre-
requisites for jurisdiction); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) 
(holding that a corporate subsidiary’s contacts within the forum state did 
not rise to the level of “continuous and systematic” needed to permit 
jurisdiction); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 
(2011) (holding that an out-of-state defendant lacked the requisite “systematic 
and continuous general business contacts” to allow the forum state to entertain 
suit against them); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that a foreign manufacturer did not engage in 
conduct purposefully directed at the forum state so as to subject them to 
personal jurisdiction in that state). 
4. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a 
New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 207, 269 
(2014) (“[P]erhaps the initial chaos will stabilize into a new equilibrium, with 
courts re-calibrating specific jurisdictional doctrine to account for the demise 
of general contacts jurisdiction and the limitation on effects-test jurisdiction.”); 
Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, A Shifting 
Equilibrium: Personal Jurisdiction, Transnational Litigation, and the Problem 
of Nonparties, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 643 (2015) (examining how the 
jurisdictional changes affected transnational litigation). 
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the business lobby wanted answered, and it increased litigation costs 
by leaving open new avenues for jurisdictional challenges. Instead, it 
appears that the Court was driven more by a commitment to formalist 
evaluation of individual cases and a generalized resistance to allowing 
United States courts to serve as a magnet forum for transnational 
litigation. 
We then evaluate the likely progression of the Court’s further juris-
dictional jurisprudence in light of these underlying commitments. We 
conclude that although it is difficult to predict exactly how the Court 
will rule in the currently pending issues involving the “relatedness” 
prong and in the “consent by registration” cases, it is clear that future 
cases will rely heavily on factual development to determine the scope, 
type, duration, and effect of the defendant’s in-forum contacts. In Part 
III, we then turn to the challenges of jurisdictional discovery created by 
the increased need for factual development, analyzing how the Roberts 
Court’s recent changes to the discovery rules are likely to play out in 
the jurisdictional context. Although the discovery rules were recently 
amended in an attempt to reduce costs and promote efficiency, courts 
and rulemakers alike will need to give additional attention to juris-
dictional discovery; until they do so, businesses and other litigants are 
likely to continue to face jurisdictional uncertainty. 
I. The Roberts Court’s Approach to  
Personal Jurisdiction 
After decades of Supreme Court neglect, the Roberts Court issued 
four personal jurisdiction cases in a period spanning less than four 
years.5 Each of these cases narrowed personal jurisdiction doctrine, 
holding that the defendant in each case could not constitutionally be 
subject to involuntary personal jurisdiction in the state where it was 
sued. The decisions were, in effect, defendant-friendly: in each of the 
cases, the defendant had objected to being haled into the plaintiff’s 
choice of forum, and in each case the Court ultimately ruled that the 
defendant could not be sued there.6 Thus, to the extent that business 
 
5. Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115; Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. 746; Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. 915; Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873. 
6. Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (holding that the defendant lacked sufficient contacts 
with the forum state to establish jurisdiction, even though the defendant’s 
conduct had effects in the desired forum state); Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. 746 
(holding that a foreign corporation could not be subject to general jurisdiction 
when it was not “at home” in the state); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A., 564 U.S. 915 (holding that general jurisdiction was appropriate only 
when the defendant’s contacts were so “‘continuous and systematic’ as to 
render them essentially at home in the forum State”); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd., 
564 U.S. 873 (holding that a foreign manufacturer could not be subject to 
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interests are often viewed as largely synonymous with defendants’ inter-
ests, the decisions may be considered to be protective of business inter-
ests as a whole.7 As with the larger theme of Professor Jonathan Adler’s 
conclusion in Business and the Roberts Court, however, the jurispru-
dential story is more complicated.8 
A. The New Equilibrium of Personal Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court had long distinguished between two types of 
personal jurisdiction. General, or dispute-blind jurisdiction, allowed a 
court to exercise jurisdiction against a particular defendant for any 
claim, regardless of where it arose or whether it had any connection to 
the forum.9 Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, allowed a court to 
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only for cases sufficiently related 
to the judicial forum.10 The paradigm case for general jurisdiction was 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.11 The paradigm case for 
specific jurisdiction was International Shoe Co. v. Washington.12 
 
jurisdiction merely because its product, sold through a U.S. distributor, caused 
injury within the forum). 
7. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 1081, 1107 
n.175 (2015) (“This theory is consistent with the belief that the Supreme Court 
is generally business friendly, which often translates as defendant friendly.”). 
8. Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction to Business and the Roberts Court 1, 
12 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016) (“So while there is little evidence the Court 
seeks to help business as such, there are aspects of the Court’s dominant 
jurisprudence that work to the advantage of business interests.”). 
9. Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court’s New Approach to Personal 
Jurisdiction, 68 SMU L. Rev. 107, 138–39 (2015) (distinguishing the evolving 
definitions of general and specific jurisdictions). 
10. Id. 
11. 342 U.S. 437, 444 (1952) (holding that an Ohio court could exercise jurisdiction 
over a mining corporation based in the Philippines, on account of the com-
pany’s overwhelming, not suit-related, ties to the state of Ohio that allowed 
the company president to direct the foreign corporation from Ohio, where he 
resided); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 927–
28 (“Our 1952 decision in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. remains 
‘[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a 
foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the forum.’”) (quoting 
Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
12. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (holding that a court could constitutionally exercise 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when the defendant has “certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’”) (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
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Between these poles, however, there was much room for debate. 
What kind of contacts, short of the corporation-directing activity pre-
sent in Perkins, would suffice to allow dispute-blind jurisdiction?13 How 
should the “minimum contacts” and “fairness” factors be weighed to 
determine whether specific jurisdiction would be appropriate?14 
For decades, these questions were addressed by state supreme 
courts and federal circuit courts of appeals, which developed their own 
doctrinal formulations.15 Before the Roberts Court decided the new per-
sonal jurisdiction cases, first-year law students across the nation learned 
the approach developed in these courts.16 This approach held that gen-
eral jurisdiction was appropriate when a defendant’s in-state contacts 
were continuous, systematic, and substantial (thus allowing Wal-Mart, 
for example, to be subject to dispute-blind jurisdiction in all fifty 
states), but that specific jurisdiction under the International Shoe 
framework required a fairly tight nexus between the defendant’s in-
state contacts and the plaintiff’s cause of action.17 Although there were 
 
13. See, e.g., Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. 
Rev. 610, 667–70 (1988) (arguing in favor of limiting general jurisdiction to 
a defendant’s “home base”); Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General 
Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 721, 735–48 (1988) (analyzing the quantity 
and quality of contacts needed to exercise general jurisdiction); Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 
807, 808–12 (2004) (proposing a theoretical foundation of general adjudicatory 
jurisdiction predicated on sovereign power over nonresidents engaging in 
forum activities analogous to the activities conducted by local domiciliaries). 
14. See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1144–63 (1966) 
(describing the various judicial analyses for specific jurisdiction and noting 
how the analyses comport with the due process clause); Charles W. “Rocky” 
Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-
First Century World, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 387, 400–412 (2012) (explaining the 
Supreme Court’s use of purposeful availment to correlate minimum contacts 
and fairness). 
15. Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot “At Home”?: Daimler v. Bauman 
and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 Hastings L.J. 233, 241 
(2014) (noting that prior to Daimler “[t]here were few guideposts for courts 
deciding whether a corporation was doing business such that it would be 
subject to general jurisdiction” and that lower courts were therefore “largely 
left to their own devices in determining when a corporation would or would 
not be subject to general jurisdiction”). 
16. Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Significant Contacts: 
General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 Ohio St. 
L.J. 101, 114–15 (2015) (noting that “[t]reatises printed as black letter law 
that corporations were subject to general jurisdiction wherever they engaged 
in a sufficiently high level of business activity” and that a leading casebook 
presented it as settled law). 
17. Id. at 110–13. 
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some areas of disagreement between the circuits, this equilibrium fun-
ctioned fairly stably for decades.18 
In 2011, the Court decided the first two cases: J. McIntyre 
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro19 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown.20 Both cases arose out of transnational commerce, were 
decided on the same day, and appeared to make relatively minor clarifi-
cations in personal jurisdiction doctrine. In Nicastro, the Court was 
asked to decide whether a New Jersey court could exercise specific juris-
diction over J. McIntyre Machinery, an English manufacturer; the 
record did not indicate that more than a handful of its machines had 
been sold through its U.S. distributor to New Jersey customers, but 
plaintiffs argued that McIntyre had sufficiently “targeted” the forum 
by marketing its products throughout the United States, including New 
Jersey.21 A divided Court concluded that such generalized and indirect 
targeting was insufficient to support jurisdiction, at least in the absence 
of regular forum sales.22 In Goodyear, the Court was asked to decide 
whether a North Carolina court could exercise general jurisdiction over 
a Turkish subsidiary of the Goodyear Corporation, when the tires man-
ufactured by the Turkish subsidiary allegedly caused an accident 
involving children from North Carolina in France.23 Again, the Court 
held that such jurisdiction was improper, writing that the subsidiary’s 
“attenuated connections to the State . . . fall far short of . . . ‘the 
continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary to em-
power North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims un-
related to anything that connects them to the State.”24 Instead, the 
Court said, general jurisdiction was appropriate only when those con-
tacts were so extensive that the defendant was “essentially at home” in 
the forum.25 
 
18. Id. at 104–09. 
19. 564 U.S. 873 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
20. 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
21. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 877–89. 
22. Id. at 880–87. A plurality concluded that McIntyre did not appropriately 
“manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign” because the 
company did not target New Jersey on its own for the transmission of goods. 
Id. at 882–87. Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion reasoned that the Court’s 
prior cases had never considered a similar singular sale through a distributor 
as sufficient for jurisdiction. Id. at 888–89 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
23. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A., 564 U.S. at 918–19. 
24. Id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
25. Id. at 919; see Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in 
Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 527, 535–36 (2012) (arguing that the 
Court provided little guidance for ascertaining when a corporation is 
“essentially at home”). 
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In the 2013–14 term, the Court again returned to the subject of 
personal jurisdiction, deciding two additional cases. One of those was 
Walden v. Fiore,26 which further refined the type of “targeting” neces-
sary for specific jurisdiction; it held that the defendant’s mere awareness 
that the plaintiff will feel the effects of the defendant’s conduct in a 
particular forum is insufficient to amount to targeting that forum for 
jurisdictional purposes.27 This might have been viewed as a relatively 
significant decision,28 but it was overshadowed by the Court’s other 
personal jurisdiction case of the term, Daimler AG v. Bauman.29 
Daimler utterly upended the structure of personal jurisdiction.30 It 
involved another transnational case, this time brought by Argentinian 
plaintiffs suing over the actions of Mercedes-Benz during the Argen-
tinian “Dirty War.”31 The plaintiffs sought to proceed against the Ger-
man parent company, DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft, relying on 
the extensive California contacts of its American subsidiary.32 The 
Court held that the “continuous and systematic general business con-
tacts” test applied by the circuit courts for general jurisdiction was the 
wrong test.33 Instead, the Court maintained, the relevant analysis was 
the one alluded to—but not expanded upon—in Goodyear: was the 
defendant “at home” in the forum?34 The Court explained that in all 
 
26. 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014). 
27. Id. at 1124–26. 
28. Although Walden was not as earth-shaking as Daimler, it will nevertheless 
have a significant impact on a large set of cases. See Allan Erbsen, Personal 
Jurisdiction Based on the Local Effects of Intentional Misconduct, 57 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 385, 390 (2015) (“Hard cases abound because the events 
underlying litigation frequently sprawl across borders.”); Lee Goldman, From 
Calder to Walden and Beyond: The Proper Application of the “Effects Test” 
in Personal Jurisdiction Cases, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 357, 358 (2015) (“With 
the advent of the Internet and the explosion of new technology, individuals 
are accused of causing injury in distant states in which they have had no direct 
contacts on a daily basis.”). 
29. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
30. Linda J. Silberman, The End of Another Era: Reflections on Daimler and Its 
Implications for Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States, 19 Lewis & Clark 
L. Rev. 675, 691–92 (2015) (“Daimler has apparently removed a heretofore 
well-entrenched concept of general jurisdiction over corporations on the basis 
of continuous and systematic activities even when substantial in nature. The 
case has transformed, perhaps even for the better, the law of general jurisdic-
tion in the United States.”). 
31. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751–52. 
32. Id. at 751. 
33. Id. at 760–61. 
34. Id. at 760–62. The Court’s new formulation of the test as being where the 
defendant was “at home” was even a change from the allusion in Goodyear, 
which had described general jurisdiction as appropriate where the defendant 
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except the most unusual circumstances, a defendant would be at home 
in no more than two jurisdictions: the state of incorporation and the 
state in which the corporation maintained its principal place of busi-
ness.35 Since Daimler was a German company with a principal place of 
business in Germany, it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Cali-
fornia courts for claims arising from its alleged actions in Argentina.36 
Even under the assumption that its American subsidiary’s regional 
office in the state should be attributed to it for jurisdictional purposes, 
that was not enough to render it “at home” in California.37 
This was a major change. It required re-writing every first-year 
Civil Procedure casebook, as the “continuous and systematic” test had 
been previously viewed as well-settled law.38 It also took many courts 
and litigants by surprise. In cases all over the country, where defendants 
who engaged in nationwide activity had previously not even bothered 
to contest jurisdiction, defendants were suddenly raising personal juris-
diction defenses, even in long-running cases.39 
The Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence—and particularly 
its decision in Daimler—thus ignited a domino reaction. In cases where 
the nonresident defendant had pervasive in-state contacts, jurisdiction 
would previously not have even been an issue under the “continuous 
and systematic” test. But now that general jurisdiction only applies 
 
was “essentially at home,” “fairly regarded as at home,” or “in [a] sense at 
home.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 919, 924, 
930 (2016). 
35. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. 
36. Id. at 748. 
37. Id. at 752. 
38. See Cornett & Hoffheimer, supra note 16, at 104 (“Despite the Court’s 
assurance that its decisions are guided by tradition, Daimler departs from 
settled law.”). 
39. See Ariel G. Atlas, Note, Who Says You Can’t Go “Home”? Retroactivity in 
a Post-Daimler World, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 1597, 1599 (2016) (examining 
retroactivity “through motions for reconsideration in pending civil cases”); 
Brooke A. Weedon, Note, New Limits on General Personal Jurisdiction: 
Examining the Retroactive Application of Daimler in Long-Pending Cases, 
72 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1549, 1552 (2015) (“The disagreement over 
Daimler’s significance is especially problematic in long-pending cases in which 
defendants have moved for dismissals on the grounds that personal jurisdiction 
no longer exists because of the apparently stricter Daimler test.”). Most courts 
have allowed the defendants to make new challenges in light of the existing 
law, see id. at 1587, even though forfeiture and waiver are typically employed 
by courts to lessen the impact of sudden legal changes. See Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, Over the Threshold of Constitutional Adjudicative 
Retroactivity, (manuscript at 41), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2783954 
[https://perma.cc/UJ4F-AFZU] (“[C]ourts also appraise whether to forgive 
forfeitures related to unanticipated and sudden legal changes.”). 
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when the defendant is “at home,” the battleground has shifted to ex-
ploring other potential bases for jurisdiction. Courts are now confron-
ting previously unresolved jurisdictional conundrums, such as the 
extent of the “relatedness” test for specific jurisdiction, whether juris-
diction may be premised on the presence of a separate state-related 
claim (“pendant” personal jurisdiction), and whether a state could re-
quire businesses to consent to general jurisdiction by registering to do 
business.40 The resulting uncertainty regarding the new jurisdictional 
balance on these issues is troubling in light of the need for predictability 
in jurisdictional determinations. 
B. The Business Impact of the New Equilibrium 
On the whole, the Roberts Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions 
were less favorable to business than they could have been. It is true 
that each of the four cases was decided favorably to the defendants in 
the case. It is also generally true, especially in the procedural arena, 
that policies good for defendants are thought to be good for business 
interests as well.41 Thus, for example, both the National Federation of 
Independent Business (which represents small-business interests) as 
well as the United States Chamber of Commerce (which generally repre-
sents larger corporate interests) have advocated for more limited dis-
covery rules, a change that typically favors defendants.42 
In particular, the jurisdictional shift made one major change that 
aligned with business (and defendants’) interests: it made it substan-
tially more difficult for plaintiffs to bring nationwide class actions.43 
 
40. See infra Part III. 
41. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Civil Procedure in the Roberts Court, in 
Business and the Roberts Court 143, 150 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016) 
(analyzing the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence on pleading standards and 
suggesting “that the relative rights of plaintiffs and defendants . . . need a 
readjustment”). 
42. See Anti-Biz E-Discovery Bill Defeated in Georgia House, NFIB (Apr. 6, 
2016), http://www.nfib.com/article/anti-biz-e-discovery-bill-defeated-in-
georgia-house-73522/ [https://perma.cc/4X5E-MAFR] (arguing that a 
proportionality requirement is necessary to avoid “small businesses [being] 
forced to settle lawsuits—no matter the merit of the case—simply to avoid 
the costs of defending a lawsuit”); see also John H. Beisner, The Centre 
Cannot Hold: The Need for Effective Reform of the U.S. Civil Discovery 
Process, U.S. Chamber Inst. For Legal Reform 17 (May 2010), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ilr_discovery_201
0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q47B-UYUA] (arguing against assertions that 
“claims of discovery abuse rest on unfounded perceptions that have been 
exaggerated by certain ‘pro-business’ interests”). 
43. See Rich Samp, With Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler, High Court May Have 
Put Brakes on Forum Shopping, Forbes (Feb. 4, 2014, 9:00 AM), http:// 
www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2014/02/04/with-bauman-v-daimlerchrysler-high-
court-may-have-put-brakes-on-forum-shopping [https://perma.cc/R6MX-
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With plaintiffs suing defendants who are “at home” in different states 
(perhaps a retailer and manufacturer, or product manufacturer and 
component-part maker), it may be impossible to find a single forum in 
which all defendants can be sued. As a result, plaintiffs may find it 
more difficult to proceed in a single class action—a result which aligns 
with the litigation priorities of pro-business groups, which had long ar-
gued that meritless class actions took an unwarranted toll on business 
income.44 
At the same time, however, it is quite clear that the Court’s 
jurisdictional decisions were not motivated by a direct intent to resolve 
the cases favorably to business interests. Most importantly, the Court 
did not answer the main question raised in Daimler that the business 
groups were clamoring for an answer to: that is, whether the contacts 
of a subsidiary corporation could be imputed to the parent corpor-
ation.45 That question was perfectly teed up in Daimler, could easily 
have been answered, and in fact was expected by many onlookers to be 
the main issue in the case.46 Instead, the Court left that question open, 
ripe for continued litigation, although likely the question will arise less 
often with the Court’s newfound limitations on general jurisdiction. 
The decisions also create some difficulties for businesses. First, 
although business interests may often be aligned with defendant inter-
ests, this is certainly not always true—businesses also serve as plaintiffs 
in many cases, especially when seeking to protect intellectual-property 
rights. When they do serve as plaintiffs, they will also feel the diffi-
culties raised by the Roberts Court’s jurisdictional tightening. This has 
 
EHQK] (“Daimler may even spell the end of nationwide class actions against 
multiple defendants filed anywhere other than the states (if any) in which 
all corporate defendants are ‘at home.’ . . . [S]uch claims cannot be heard . . . 
regardless of whether the defendant’s contacts with the forum state are 
extensive or whether consolidating all claims would be efficient.”). 
44. See Joanna C. Schwartz, The Cost of Suing Business, 65 DePaul L. Rev. 
655, 655 (2016) (“[T]he Chamber of Commerce and other business amici tell 
the same story: Meritless class actions . . . are so devastatingly expensive to 
defend against . . . that corporate defendants cannot help but accept ‘blackmail 
settlements’ that harm both businesses’ bottom lines and society at large.”); 
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation as a Measure of Well-Being, 62 DePaul 
L. Rev. 247, 247 (2013) (“[P]ortraying much litigation as pathological is a 
key component of business lobbying groups’ social construction of the legal 
system.”). 
45. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 759 (2014) (“[W]e need not pass 
judgment on invocation of an agency theory in the context of general juris-
diction, for in no event can the appeals court’s analysis be sustained.”). 
46. Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the 
Fallacy of Consent, 36 Cardozo L. Rev. 1343, 1356 (2015) (“The Court 
sidestepped the thorny issue of when a subsidiary’s contacts are imputable to 
a parent.”). 
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created difficulties already for companies such as Gucci and Tiffany and 
Co., who sought to enforce their trademark rights by seeking to freeze 
assets derived from counterfeiting and held in the New York branch of 
the Bank of China.47 Similarly, pharmaceutical companies have strug-
gled to obtain jurisdiction over parties seeking to market generic drugs 
that potentially infringed plaintiffs’ patent rights.48 
Even more significantly, however, the decisions raise more questions 
about jurisdiction than they answer. Both the NFIB and the Chamber 
of Commerce have expressed the importance of predictability in per-
sonal jurisdiction.49 But predictability is one thing that the Roberts 
Court jettisoned when it re-wrote the jurisdictional doctrine that the 
lower courts had long applied. The Court left for future litigation signif-
icant issues such as the necessary “relatedness” inquiry,50 the avail-
ability of “pendant” personal jurisdiction, and the role of corporate reg-
istration statutes.51 This uncertainty alone significantly raises litigation 
costs for businesses and other parties, who must now spend time and 
money litigating personal jurisdiction issues that would have earlier 
been viewed as so well settled not to require briefing or argument.52 
 
47. Robertson & Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 673 (noting 
that transnational trademark-infringement cases “require effective access to 
national courts”). 
48. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 598 
(D. Del. 2015), aff’d, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see Megan La Belle, 
Consent to General Personal Jurisdiction, PrawfsBlawg (May 10, 2016), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/05/consent-to-general-
personal-jurisdiction.html [https://perma.cc/Y6ZX-EJFG] (discussing cases 
where companies had difficulties establishing jurisdiction). 
49. Motion for Leave to File and Brief for Amici Curiae the Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America et al. in Support of Petitioner at 
2, BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, No. 16-405 (U.S. Oct. 28, 2016), 2016 WL 
6473001 at *2 (“Movants’ members thus have a keen interest in the pre-
dictability that comes when courts follow fair rules for personal jurisdiction 
and abide by the decisions of this Court.”). 
50. The Court recently granted certiorari to consider this issue. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of S.F. Cty., 377 P.3d 874 (Cal. 2016), cert 
granted, 137 S.Ct. 827 (2017). 
51. Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 229 
(“[J]urisdictional disputes won’t go away but will simply move to a new 
playing field.”). 
52. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Personal Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice 
Litigation, 6 St. Mary’s J. Legal Mal. & Ethics 2, 15 (2016) (noting 
that under “[t]he prior pervasiveness of the ‘continuous and systematic’ 
standard” many defendants “did not even challenge jurisdiction”). 
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II. The Roberts Court’s Guiding Principles 
If the Roberts Court is not driven by an intent to favor business, 
then what principles undergird its approach to personal jurisdiction? 
And, perhaps more importantly, can those principles suggest how the 
Court might rule with regard to some of the open questions? Two guide-
posts stand out in this inquiry: a reluctance to draw foreign disputes 
into United States courts and an overall commitment to formalistic 
notions of sovereignty dependent upon territorial boundaries. Both 
these considerations suggest that jurisdictional determinations will ne-
cessitate factual determinations and be less susceptible to categorical—
or easily predictable—results. 
A. Limitations on Transnational Litigation 
It is no coincidence that three of the cases in which the Court 
established new limitations on personal jurisdiction arose in trans-
national cases. The Court could have selected any number of personal 
jurisdiction cases on which to grant certiorari, but, after a nearly 
quarter-century of silence on personal jurisdiction, its personal juris-
diction resurgence focused largely on transnational cases. Other scholars 
have noted that the Roberts Court in general has been skeptical of 
doctrines that allow the United States to act as a magnet forum for 
cases arising abroad.53 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in Daimler stated 
explicitly that “the risks to international comity” should be part of the 
jurisdictional analysis, and noted that the prior American acceptance 
of a broad jurisdictional standard has potentially “impeded negotiations 
of international agreements” on judgment recognition.54 
The Supreme Court’s attempt to restrict exorbitant jurisdiction 
may have both good and bad effects. On the positive side, the Court is 
undoubtedly correct that limiting general jurisdiction brings the United 
 
53. See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational 
Cases: The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 
995, 998 (2015) (“Generally speaking, U.S. federal courts are increasingly 
reluctant to adjudicate transnational cases. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has 
made substantial refinements to doctrines such as personal jurisdiction, 
forum non conveniens, and the extraterritorial application of U.S. federal law 
that pose substantial obstacles for filing transnational suits in U.S. federal 
courts, especially under federal law.”) (citation omitted); David L. Noll, The 
New Conflicts Law, 2 Stan. J. Complex Litig. 41, 43 (2014) (“In areas as 
diverse as securities fraud, personal jurisdiction, and human rights, the 
Supreme Court has restricted private regulatory enforcement in U.S. courts 
to prevent interference with foreign nations’ efforts to regulate harm.”); 
Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming 
a Paper Tiger?, 33 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 663, 672 (2012) (evaluating “recent 
developments in three different doctrinal areas that make litigation harder 
to maintain in United States courts”). 
54. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
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States more in line with international practice.55 In general, the Roberts 
Court’s trend away from welcoming foreign litigants has been appre-
ciated by international business interests who were previously wary of 
being sued within the United States.56 This shift may even facilitate the 
adoption of a treaty on judgment recognition and enforcement.57 
On the other hand, however, the Court’s reduced willingness to 
uphold jurisdiction in transnational cases is not an unmitigated win for 
business interests. As one scholar as pointed out, “the jurisdictional 
reach of domestic courts may be shrinking at a time when access to 
justice may demand an expanded jurisdictional reach.”58 Thus, for 
example, U.S. businesses may have a more difficult time reaching assets 
housed in foreign banks doing business in the United States.59 Similarly, 
in another “potentially unforeseen consequence,” jurisdictional tighten-
ing has made it more difficult in some instances for parties to obtain 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards.60 
 
55. Bookman, supra note 7, at 1140 (noting that “[t]he Court in Goodyear and 
Daimler has already brought general personal jurisdiction doctrine into line 
with internationally accepted ideas that domicile (as opposed to other kinds 
of contacts) reflects a valid basis for jurisdiction” and arguing that personal 
jurisdiction should be viewed in relation to the Court’s other doctrines that 
affect when and whether cases can go forward in the United States). 
56. Burbank, supra note 53, at 664 (“[T]he need of foreign companies for protection 
against litigation in U.S. courts is less today than it has been in decades, in 
both absolute and comparative dimensions.”). 
57. See Samuel P. Baumgartner, The External Dimensions of the European Law 
of Civil Procedure—A Transatlantic Perspective, in Der Europäische 
Gerichtsverbund—Die Internationalen Dimensionen des Euro-
päischen Verfahrensrechts (Burkhard Hess ed.) (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 34), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2742330 [https://perma.cc/ 
A4WK-LDCE] (“[W]ith all the changes in U.S. litigation practice . . . the 
European interest in limiting the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts in 
transnational cases should have diminished considerably.”). 
58. Michael Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Court’s New 
Personal Jurisdiction Case Law, 21 U.C. Davis J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 209, 
277 (2015). 
59. See Robertson & Rhodes, A Shifting Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 647–48 
(“[T]ransnational judgment enforcement is difficult at best.”). 
60. Silberman, supra note 30, at 690; see also Sonera Holding B.V. v. Çukurova 
Holdings A.S., 750 F.3d 221, 224–25 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Whatever the purported 
scope of [New York law], Daimler confirmed that subjecting Çukurova to 
general jurisdiction in New York would be incompatible with due process.”); 
Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 344, 350 (2016) (“Although a jurisdictional nexus should be required 
to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards and foreign country judg-
ments, the distinction between a plenary action and an action for recognition 
and enforcement justifies a more relaxed jurisdictional nexus in the recognition 
and enforcement context.”); Tanya J. Monestier, Whose Law of Personal 
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B. A Commitment to Formalism and Territorial Boundaries 
The personal jurisdiction cases speak more generally to the Roberts 
Court’s commitment to formalism and respect for territorial boun-
daries.61 This principle overlaps to some extent with the Court’s reluc-
tance to open U.S. courts to cases with a primarily foreign nexus. As 
one scholar has noted, in the Roberts Court’s view, “[o]nly clean lines, 
clear rules, and cabined roles can bring foreign affairs back under 
control.”62 
The Court’s commitment to formalism goes further than a concern 
for foreign affairs law, however.63 It also carries over into the Court’s 
approach to sovereignty, federalism, and even separation of powers.64 
In general, the formalist approach favors bright-line rules over more 
malleable cost-benefit analyses.65 In the personal jurisdiction realm, the 
Court’s formalist approach suggests a sharply limited role for the ju-
diciary as well as a skepticism of plaintiffs’ broad forum choices. Forum 
shopping, after all, is a nod to the legal realities that some jurisdictions 
are more favorable than others for certain claims; it is based on the 
 
Jurisdiction? The Choice of Law Problem in the Recognition of Foreign 
Judgments, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1729, 1731 (2016) (“The most heavily litigated 
issue in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is that of 
personal jurisdiction.”). 
61. Ofer Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal 
Formalism of the Roberts Court, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 343, 390 (2014) 
(“After a century of being widely discredited, legal formalism has made a 
comeback into the heart of American legal practice.”). 
62. Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the 
Roberts Court, 83 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 380, 448 (2015). 
63. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to 
an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1173, 
1204 (2007) (“Formalism may thus indeed be long lived on the Roberts 
Court, though it will not be the pre-New Deal Court’s pervasive formalism 
predicated on natural law precepts. Instead, it appears that a more limited 
doctrinal formalism in certain contexts is emerging that formulates rules 
designed in part to further judicial deference to the political institution 
perceived to be in the best position to make the underlying judgment.”). 
64. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, 
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the 
Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing 
Federal Law, 61 Duke L.J. 1599, 1607 (2012) (noting that the Roberts 
Court’s “decisions consistently reject balancing the costs and benefits of novel 
reallocations of power and instead favor articulating and enforcing bright-line 
rules”); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal 
Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 
387, 415–22 (2012) (highlighting the formalism and rigidity of the controlling 
opinions in Goodyear). 
65. Krotoszynski, supra note 64, at 1607. 
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premise that justice may vary on the vagaries of geography unrelated 
to the merits of the claim at hand.66 
The Court’s formalist approach to shaping personal jurisdiction 
allowed the Court to jettison decades of lower-court doctrinal develop-
ment. The “continuous and systematic general business contacts” test 
for general jurisdiction, after all, was not a doctrine developed by the 
Supreme Court; instead, it was developed over decades in the lower 
courts, as those courts struggled to apply dicta from International 
Shoe.67 As a result, the Court did not need to find a way to work with 
or around that doctrine; instead, it could simply discard it. 
Similarly, the Court’s overarching respect for territorial boundaries 
meant that geographic distinctions would not be ignored—even when 
those distinctions prevented an individual litigant from obtaining a ju-
dicial remedy. Thus, for example, McIntyre, a British corporation that 
marketed its machinery throughout the United States, could not be 
subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey, where an individual plaintiff end-
ed up suffering injury; the defendant had simply not directed any con-
tacts at the state of New Jersey in particular.68 The Court also gave 
deference to corporate formalities in Daimler by accepting that a defen-
dant is “at home” in its state of incorporation—where it may do little 
or no business—in addition to the state where it maintains its principal 
place of business.69 
 
66. See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 Emory L.J. 1, 17 n.62 
(2010) (“Forum shopping can also exploit different states’ outcome-
determinative procedural or institutional quirks (such as a faster docket or 
generous juries), which likewise may justify tweaking jurisdictional tests to 
protect the defendant’s interests.”). 
67. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (“[T]he words ‘continuous 
and systematic’ were used in International Shoe to describe instances in 
which the exercise of specific jurisdiction would be appropriate.”). 
68. Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, characterized the facts in this hypothetical: 
A foreign industrialist seeks to develop a market in the United States 
for machines it manufactures. It hopes to derive substantial revenue 
from sales it makes to United States purchasers. Where in the United 
States buyers reside does not matter to this manufacturer. Its goal is 
simply to sell as much as it can, wherever it can. It excludes no region 
or State from the market it wishes to reach. But, all things considered, 
it prefers to avoid products liability litigation in the United States. 
To that end, it engages a U.S. distributor to ship its machines stateside. 
Has it succeeded in escaping personal jurisdiction in a State where one 
of its products is sold and causes injury or even death to a local user? 
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 893 (2011) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
69. Walter W. Heiser, General Jurisdiction in the Place of Incorporation: An 
Artificial “Home” for an Artificial Person, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 631, 690 (2016) 
(arguing that “the Supreme Court would better achieve its goal of limiting 
general jurisdiction through a clear and predictable due process doctrine, and 
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There is a real risk that the Court’s formalist approach may prevent 
injured parties from seeking effective relief—possibly by requiring liti-
gation in a foreign forum or one otherwise highly inconvenient to the 
plaintiff.70 To the extent that the Court’s formalist approach gives rise 
to such difficulties, it has been criticized as unduly emphasizing gate-
keeping, “erecting procedural stop signs” and thereby contradicting 
“the aspirations of the American civil justice system.”71 Nonetheless, 
the formalist approach does not necessarily mandate an ultimately un-
just result, at least as long as other aspects of the jurisdictional analysis 
may be modified to increase court access consistently with the Court’s 
doctrinal commitments.72 
C. Predicting the Court’s Approach to Unresolved Issues 
Although there are plenty of unresolved questions about the con-
tours of personal jurisdiction, two major issues—which have arisen in 
numerous cases—are currently pending before the Supreme Court. The 
first is the scope of the “relatedness” requirement for specific jurisdic-
tion, which the Supreme Court is poised to address in a case set on this 
term’s docket.73 The second is the validity of state policies that require 
 
at the same time, would be on firmer ground with respect to an underlying 
conceptual rationale, if it had designated the defendant’s principal place of 
business as the only paradigm of where a corporation is ‘essentially at 
home’”). But see Seungwon Chung, Note, The Shoe Doesn’t Fit: General 
Jurisdiction Should Follow Corporate Structure, 100 Minn. L. Rev. 1599, 
1643 (2016) (“[C]ourts should expand the corporate general jurisdiction 
doctrine, ever so slightly, by recognizing that a corporation’s exercise of 
corporate functions (i.e., direction of corporate activities and management of 
day-to-day operations) subjects a corporation to general jurisdiction.”). 
70. Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials 
on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 348 (2013) (“[I]n many circumstances consumers and 
employees would not be able to seek redress in the state where they purchase 
or receive defective products or services, or live, or were injured. Rather, 
plaintiffs potentially would have to litigate in distant fora—possibly in 
foreign countries—or abandon their claims altogether.”). 
71. Id. at 369.  
72. See Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 269 
(recommending such a judicial balancing act). 
73. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of S.F. Cty., 377 P.3d 874, 884 
(Cal. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 WL 215687 (Cal. Jan. 19, 2017) (No. 16-466) 
(applying the “substantial connection” test for relatedness, which “requires 
courts to evaluate the nature of the defendant’s activities in the forum and 
the relationship of the claim to those activities in order to answer the 
ultimate question under the due process clause: whether the exercise of 
jurisdiction in the forum is fair”). Other pending cases before the Court 
present similar issues. See TV Azteca v. Ruiz, 490 S.W.3d 29, 52–53 (Tex. 
2016), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Oct. 12, 2016) (No. 16-481) (“This 
‘substantial connection’ standard does not require proof that the plaintiff 
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a business to submit to general jurisdiction as a condition of doing busi-
ness.74 Other issues, such as the unanswered question of imputed con-
tacts, have taken a backseat—perhaps because the Roberts Court’s 
formalist approach and general jurisdiction narrowing have made them 
viewed as less likely to be successful.75 
We have argued elsewhere that a broader “relatedness” standard 
may be necessary to ensure that injured litigants have access to the 
courthouse after the Court narrowed other aspects of jurisdictional 
doctrine.76 Ideally, jurisdictional doctrine would take into account both 
the pervasiveness of the defendant’s contacts and the regulatory inter-
ests of the forum—a stronger regulatory interest and more pervasive 
contacts could allow a looser connection between those contacts and 
the plaintiff’s cause of action.77 
 
would have no claim ‘but for’ the contacts, or that the contacts were a 
‘proximate cause’ of the liability.”). 
74. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 587 
(D. Del. 2015), aff’d, 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 2017 WL 
69716 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2017) (No. 16-360) (concluding “that this Court may 
exercise general jurisdiction over Mylan Pharma based on Mylan Pharma’s 
consent, consent which Mylan Pharma gave when it complied with the 
Delaware business registration statute by appointing a registered agent in 
Delaware to accept service of process”). But see In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 
Corn Litig., MDL No. 2591, 2016 WL 2866166, at *6 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016) 
(“[E]ven if the Kansas statute requiring consent to general jurisdiction were 
not deemed improperly discriminatory, it would nonetheless fail to pass muster 
under the applicable balancing test.”); Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 
F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The reach of that coercive power, even when 
exercised pursuant to a corporation’s purported ‘consent,’ may be limited by 
the Due Process clause. We need not reach that question here, however, 
because we conclude that the Connecticut business registration statute did not 
require Lockheed to consent to general jurisdiction in exchange for the right 
to do business in the state.”). 
75. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Pennoyer Strikes Back: Personal Jurisdiction in a 
Global Age, 3 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 1, 25 (2015) (“Based on prior Supreme 
Court decisions, however, it is not anticipated that the Supreme Court will 
look favorably on the concept of judicial veil-piercing.”); see also Suzanna 
Sherry, Don’t Answer That! Why (and How) the Supreme Court Should Duck 
the Issue in DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 Vand. L. Rev. En Banc 111, 
116 (2013) (“[S]etting a high bar for piercing the corporate veil across the 
board—including in all jurisdictional contexts—continues and entrenches a 
formalist approach to corporate separateness that does not reflect either the 
reality or the diversity of corporate forms and that allows corporations to 
externalize costs.”). 
76. See Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 267–68 
(“[T]he Supreme Court must expand its defendant-centric focus to incorporate 
a more thorough analysis of the countervailing . . . interests at issue.”). 
77. Id. at 212; see also Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty 
Interest in Personal Jurisdiction, 66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 769, 772 (2016) 
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It is difficult to predict whether the Court would adopt this 
analysis. On the one hand, like the “continuous and systematic” stan-
dard for general jurisdiction, a tight nexus to jurisdictional contacts 
was never required by the Supreme Court, but was instead developed 
by the lower courts.78 While some circuits applied a strict causal rela-
tionship test requiring that the defendant’s in-forum contacts gave rise 
to the plaintiff’s cause of action, the Supreme Court has always articu-
lated the standard as one in which the case may “arise from or relate 
to” the forum.79 On the other hand, however, a broad “relatedness” 
standard would again make it easier to plaintiffs to establish juris-
diction in forums beyond the defendant’s home state—a result that the 
business groups have warned against in pending litigation.80 And per-
haps most importantly for a Court that appears driven more by form-
alist concerns than an outright desire to protect business interests, a 
causal test is a bright-line rule that may appear easier to apply.81 
Nor is it easy to predict the Court’s approach to the “consent by 
registration” arguments. Such an approach would again widen the 
jurisdictional reach of the states, a result that the pro-business groups 
view as problematic.82 Of course, not every state would adopt a 
jurisdictional-consent requirement for corporate registration. The Del-
aware Supreme Court, for example, recently held that such an approach 
was both counterproductive to state policies and “constitutionally prob-
lematic.”83 Nonetheless, the Delaware Court noted that the issue had 
 
(arguing “that state sovereignty should be seen as a basic theoretical 
justification for the constitutional restrictions on personal jurisdiction”). 
78. Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 230–32. 
79. Id. at 231. 
80. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners at 12–13, TV Azteca v. Ruiz, (U.S. Nov. 14, 2016) (No. 16-481) 
(arguing that the “substantial connection” approach applied by the California 
Supreme Court “expands plaintiffs’ ability to engage in forum-shopping”). 
81. It may prove more difficult in application, especially if significant jurisdictional 
discovery and fact-finding is necessary to establish the but-for relationship. 
See infra Part III. 
82. See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce et al., supra note 80, at 11–12 
(discussing the risks of forum shopping when jurisdiction is widened). 
83. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016) (“Our citizens 
benefit from having foreign corporations offer their goods and services here. 
If the cost of doing so is that those foreign corporations will be subject to 
general jurisdiction in Delaware, they rightly may choose not to do so. More-
over, in our federal republic, exacting such a disproportionate toll on commerce 
is itself constitutionally problematic.”). 
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been raised in many courts since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daimler.84 
The Court’s penchant for private ordering and formalistic sover-
eignty may nonetheless suggest that it would uphold state legislative 
action that affirmatively predicated corporate registration on consent 
to jurisdiction. Certainly, the Court would be highly unlikely to infer 
such consent to jurisdiction based on corporate registration alone with-
out such an explicit requirement.85 And it may conclude that a state 
exceeds its power in requiring consent to jurisdiction in cases wholly 
unrelated to matters where the state possesses a regulatory interest—
for example, an interest in protecting state residents.86 But it is not 
clear that the Court would necessarily strike down state legislation that 
explicitly required consent to jurisdiction as a condition for business 
registration in those cases where the state has a valid regulatory interest 
and the plaintiff is a state resident seeking redress against an out-of-
forum defendant.87 
 
84. Id. at 144 (“Daimler only speaks to whether general jurisdiction can be 
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to 
suit in the forum. It does nothing to affect the long-standing principle that a 
defendant may consent to personal jurisdiction.”) (citing Perrigo Co. v. Merial 
Ltd., No. 8:14–CV–403, 2015 WL 1538088, at *7) (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original); Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Mylan Inc., 106 F. Supp. 3d 456, 
469 (D.N.J. 2015) (“[D]esignation of an in-state agent for service of process in 
accordance with a state registration statute may constitute consent to personal 
jurisdiction, if supported by the breadth of the statute’s text or interpreta-
tion.”); Senju Pharm. Co. v. Metrics, Inc., 96 F. Supp. 3d 428, 437 (D.N.J. 
2015) (“[Daimler] did not disturb the consent-by-in-state service rule . . . .”); 
Beach v. Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC, No. 12 Civ. 7717(PKC), 2014 WL 904650, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014) (“Notwithstanding these limitations, a corpora-
tion may consent to jurisdiction in New York under [New York’s general juris-
diction statute] by registering as a foreign corporation and designating a local 
agent.”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 136 n.15 (2d Cir. 2014) 
(noting in dicta that “[t]he district court may also consider [on remand] 
whether [the defendant bank] has consented to personal jurisdiction in New 
York by applying for authorization to conduct business in New York and desig-
nating the New York Secretary of State as its agent for service of process”). 
85. Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 261 (“[M]ost 
commentators agree that implied consent, such as statutes that designate a 
state official as the agent for service of process, cannot give rise to jurisdiction 
for conduct unrelated to forum activity.”). 
86. Id. at 261–62; see also John F. Preis, The Dormant Commerce Clause as a 
Limit on Personal Jurisdiction, 102 Iowa L. Rev. 121, 143 (2016) (sugges-
ting that consent-by-registration jurisdiction comports with the Dormant 
Commerce Clause only “when the plaintiff is a state resident (whether injured 
in or out of state) or a non-state resident” who was injured within the state). 
87. See Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness and General Jurisdiction, 95 
Neb. L. Rev. 477, 540 (arguing that such an approach could allow the Court 
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What is clear, however, is that regardless of how the Court rules in 
these particular cases, courts conducting jurisdictional analyses will be 
increasingly asked to make important factual determinations. Without 
the backstop of the “continuous and systematic” rule for general juris-
diction, courts will now have to inquire into the type, duration, and 
scope of the defendant’s contacts with the forum—no matter how exten-
sive those contacts are—and ascertain whether those contacts are suffic-
iently related to the plaintiff’s cause of action. This will necessitate an 
earlier understanding of the claims asserted and the types of activities 
that are sufficiently related to those claims to be a factor in the juris-
dictional analysis. And the potential difficulties will not be alleviated 
even if the Court allows states to extract consent to jurisdiction as a 
condition of corporate registration, as some states have rejected consent 
through registration entirely, and even those who do allow it may have 
to undertake a case-by-case analysis of the state’s regulatory interest. 
The contours of any new equilibrium for personal jurisdiction are thus 
likely to be fact-driven. 
III. The Upcoming Challenge: Jurisdictional Discovery 
Even before Daimler cast newfound uncertainties on the permissible 
scope of personal jurisdiction, the facts in a jurisdictional challenge 
mattered. For example, Nicastro likely would have established juris-
diction for his personal injury product-liability claim over the British 
manufacturer McIntyre in New Jersey state court (with the concurring 
justices joining the dissenting justices) if he had been able to demon-
strate that McIntyre’s machines were regularly sold through its U.S. 
distributor to New Jersey customers. But Nicastro failed, as Justice 
Breyer noted, to establish such facts through the discovery process.88 
Justice Ginsburg’s objection that this omission might have arisen from 
McIntyre’s obstruction went unanswered.89 
Such examples of judicial reliance on “missing” record facts to the 
detriment of plaintiffs attempting to establish a nonresident defendant’s 
amenability to suit have not been uncommon. The Supreme Court is 
 
to “create a clear process whereby proper personal jurisdiction involving po-
tential corporate defendants with a national market is easily and predictably 
analyzed for both specific and general jurisdiction”). 
88. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 889–90 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., concurring) (“There may well have been other facts that Mr. Nicastro 
could have demonstrated in support of jurisdiction. . . . But the plaintiff bears 
the burden of establishing jurisdiction . . . .”). 
89. Id. at 898 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[However,] McIntyre UK resisted 
Nicastro’s efforts to determine whether other McIntyre machines had been 
sold to New Jersey customers.”). 
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no stranger to the practice,90 and lower federal and state courts have 
employed it as well.91 In some of these cases, the presumption against 
the plaintiff arising from the missing record fact defies the probabilities 
associated with typical business practices. The Nicastro plurality, for 
example, accepted McIntyre’s assertion that “no more than four 
machines (the record suggests only one . . . ), including the machine 
that caused the injuries that are the basis for this suit, ended up in New 
Jersey.”92 But is it reasonable to believe that only four or fewer of 
McIntyre’s scrap-metal shearing machines were sold to New Jersey, 
even though McIntyre’s high-ranking corporate officers attended annual 
conventions every year in the U.S. to market their shearing machines 
and New Jersey is the largest processor of scrap metal in the U.S.?93 
Or, to take another example, is it likely that no previous automobile 
sold by a regional distributor of automobiles and a New York dealership 
journeyed to Oklahoma before one such vehicle purchased by the 
Robinsons was tragically slammed from behind?94 Nonetheless, because 
courts might uncritically accept such improbable inferences from a sil-
ent record, the plaintiff must be prepared to augment probabilities with 
evidence. 
This challenge confronting plaintiffs will only intensify now, as the 
ultimate jurisdictional touchstone after Daimler is uncertain. In many 
cases, then, plaintiffs will not be certain of the legal standard that will 
be dispositive in their cases, much less what evidence will be needed to 
satisfy that standard. And the plaintiffs’ ability to conduct the needed 
discovery may be sharply curtailed in federal courts (and those state 
courts adopting the federal standards) under the recent amendments to 
the federal discovery rules promulgated under the supervision of the 
Roberts Court. 
 
90. E.g., id. (detailing McIntyre’s difficulty locating records concerning the 
“ultimate destination of machines it shipped”); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289 (1980) (“[T]here was no showing that 
any automobile sold by World-Wide or Seaway has ever entered Oklahoma 
with the single exception of the vehicle involved in the present case.”). 
91. E.g., CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594–96 (Tex. 1996) (concluding 
there was “no direct evidence” that an Australian sales agent for raw asbestos 
fiber knew that its asbestos fiber would be distributed in Texas, even though 
more than 350 tons of fiber in one of its many transactions with the purchaser 
was shipped by the purchaser directly to Houston, Texas). 
92. Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion). 
93. Cf. id. at 897–98, 898 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing McIntyre 
UK’s business involvement throughout the United States). 
94. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 289, 295 (presuming, based on the 
lack of contrary evidence, that no automobile sold by the distributor and 
dealer had previously entered Oklahoma). 
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A. The New Scope of Discovery 
The prior version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) 
authorized discovery of “any non-privileged matter that is relevant to 
any party’s claim or defense,” creating a broad presumption of discover-
ability subject to the potential court-ordered limitations under Rule 
26(b)(2)(C) for unduly burdensome discovery outweighing its antici-
pated benefits, when considering the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties’ resources, and the importance of the issues and 
the sought discovery in resolving those issues.95 After its December 2015 
amendment, Rule 26(b)(1) now authorizes “discovery of any non-privi-
leged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and propor-
tional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues 
at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 
access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of 
the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense 
of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”96 The prior 
broad presumptive discovery access subject to court-ordered limitations 
has morphed into a more limited initial discovery scope incorporating 
a proportionality principle. Although this alteration could be read as 
minimal, the rule’s proponents apparently intended a more substantial 
change.97 
And the early returns so far indicate that the change is indeed 
meaningful. Several district courts have highlighted this new 
amendment in denying or curtailing discovery requests.98 But how this 
new rule impacts jurisdictional discovery specifically has not yet been 
addressed by the courts. 
B. The Existing Approaches to Jurisdictional Discovery 
Even before the new discovery rule change and the Roberts Court’s 
upheaval of the governing jurisdictional standards, the availability and 
scope of jurisdictional discovery varied from circuit to circuit and some-
times from case to case. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged a 
role for jurisdictional discovery in Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders,99 
 
95. See Fed R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (des-
cribing the change made through the amendment).  
96. Fed R. Civ. P. 26. 
97. E.g., Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 2015 Year-End Report on 
the Federal Judiciary 5–6, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/ 
year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUN7-7Z3H] (“The 
amendments may not look like a big deal at first glance, but they are.”). 
98. E.g., Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. 2016) 
(discussing the 2015 amendment’s effect on limiting the scope of discovery).  
99. 437 U.S. 340, 351 n.13 (1978) (noting “where issues arise as to jurisdiction 
or venue, discovery is available to ascertain the facts bearing on such issues”). 
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and authorized the assumption of jurisdiction as a sanction for failing 
to comply with jurisdictional discovery in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,100 this is the sum of the 
Court’s guidance. Left to their own devices, federal district courts and 
circuit courts of appeals adopted different approaches to the availability 
and scope of jurisdictional discovery. 
These different approaches emerged in part because discovery issues 
typically are subordinate to the ultimate jurisdictional issue. Appellate 
court decisions on jurisdictional discovery almost always arise in the 
context of reviewing the lower court’s ruling on personal jurisdiction, 
with the plaintiff asserting as another point or cross-point that the 
district court erred in failing to allow the discovery of some matter that 
the plaintiff alleged would assist in ascertaining amenability. The appel-
late court’s jurisdictional discovery holding often reads as an after-
thought, corresponding with the decision to affirm or reverse on the 
primary jurisdictional issue.101 In other appellate decisions, the juris-
dictional discovery holding appears to be a vehicle to achieve interim 
justice while avoiding a final personal jurisdiction determination; the 
court, after reviewing the existing record, reasons that additional 
discovery must be obtained before resolving the jurisdictional query.102 
Even in the initial battlefield of the district courts, the jurisdictional 
 
100. 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (holding that the “legal presumption to the issue of 
personal jurisdiction does not itself violate the Due Process Clause”). 
101. E.g., Patent Rights Prot. Grp., LLC v. Video Gaming Techs., Inc., 603 F.3d 
1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding district court erred in jurisdictional 
dismissal and in denying additional jurisdictional discovery); GCIU-Emp'r 
Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and denial of jurisdictional 
discovery); Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 428–29 (5th 
Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s jurisdictional dismissal and denial of 
jurisdictional discovery); Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 
87, 93–95 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming district court’s jurisdictional dismissal 
and denial of jurisdictional discovery). 
102. E.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11 , 2001, 714 F.3d 659, 678–79 
(2d Cir. 2013) (reversing district court’s dismissal for lack of personal juris-
diction and remanding to district court for judicially supervised jurisdictional 
discovery with respect to certain defendants when plaintiffs’ allegations 
suggested jurisdiction but factual disputes persisted); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. 
Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 448 (3d Cir. 2003) (reversing district court’s 
jurisdictional dismissal and discovery denial and remanding for limited 
jurisdictional discovery to be used when reconsidering the jurisdictional issue); 
GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s certified interlocutory order upholding 
jurisdiction but remanding for jurisdictional discovery that might supplement 
the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations). 
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discovery issue often intermixes with the perceived merits of the ulti-
mate jurisdictional ruling.103 Yet, in sharp contrast to the de novo appel-
late review applicable to a district court’s legal jurisdictional determi-
nations, the district judge enjoys broad discretion with respect to 
jurisdictional discovery.104 Hence, the development of jurisdictional dis-
covery principles has been haphazard, illustrated by the three separate 
approaches employed by the circuit courts in determining whether 
jurisdictional discovery is warranted.105 
First, in some circuits, plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to at 
least some jurisdictional discovery, assuming the jurisdictional alle-
gations are neither frivolous nor futile. The Third, Ninth, Eleventh, 
and D.C. Circuits appear to follow such a permissive approach, 
although the terminology employed differs from circuit to circuit. In 
the Third Circuit, unless the jurisdictional basis is clearly frivolous, 
the district court should allow jurisdictional discovery, especially 
over a corporate defendant.106 In the Ninth Circuit, discovery should 
ordinarily be granted if relevant jurisdictional facts are controverted 
or additional jurisdictional facts are necessary, although the dis-
trict court does not err in denying jurisdictional discovery if it is clear 
that it would not uncover sufficient facts or that it is based on a 
mere hunch.107 The rule in the Eleventh Circuit appears to be that 
the plaintiff should be given the opportunity to discover facts that 
 
103. E.g., Jenkins v. Miller, 983 F. Supp. 2d 423, 446 (D. Vt. 2013) (granting 
jurisdictional discovery when plaintiffs made a “sufficient start” to establishing 
jurisdiction on a then-sparse record). Cf. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. 
Heliqwest Int’l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004) (affirming district 
court’s jurisdictional discovery denial because the discovery requests were 
unlikely to impact the jurisdictional holding). 
104. E.g., GCIU-Emp’r Ret. Fund, 565 F.3d at 1026–27 (holding district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying request for discovery); United States v. 
Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 626 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The standard for 
reversing a district court’s decision to disallow jurisdictional discovery is 
high.”); Patterson v. Dietze, Inc., 764 F.2d 1145, 1148 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“[J]urisdictional discovery is within the trial court’s discretion and ‘will not 
be disturbed ordinarily unless there are unusual circumstances showing a clear 
abuse’”) (quoting Wyatt v. Kaplan, 686 F.2d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 1982)). 
105. E.g., Mother Doe I v. Al Maktoum, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1144 (S.D. Fla. 
2007) (“The standards for permitting jurisdictional discovery vary by 
circuit.”); Ellis v. Fortune Seas, Ltd., 175 F.R.D. 308, 311–12 (S.D. Ind. 1997) 
(detailing the then-existing approaches employed by various federal courts to 
resolve jurisdictional discovery issues). 
106. Metcalfe v. Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 336 (3d Cir. 2009) (rever-
sing dismissal and remanding for jurisdictional discovery over corporate 
defendant). 
107. Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding district 
court did not abuse its discretion when request for discovery was based on 
little more than a hunch). 
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would support jurisdictional allegations, especially when the juris-
dictional issue is genuinely in dispute.108 In the D.C. Circuit, juris-
dictional discovery “should be freely permitted” unless there are no 
factual circumstances under which personal jurisdiction would be 
appropriate.109 
But a second approach in other circuits requires the plaintiff to 
satisfy a defined jurisdictional burden before being entitled to conduct 
jurisdictional discovery. As some examples, the Seventh Circuit de-
mands that the plaintiff must make a prima facie case for personal 
jurisdiction before obtaining jurisdictional discovery,110 and the Second 
Circuit employs an analogous requirement of specific jurisdictional fact-
ual allegations before jurisdictional discovery is warranted.111 In the 
Eighth Circuit, district judges abuse their discretion in disallowing 
 
108. District courts in the Eleventh Circuit developed this approach by interpreting 
circuit decisions on the availability of subject-matter jurisdictional discovery 
to also apply to in-personam jurisdictional discovery. See RMS Titanic, Inc. 
v. Zaller, 978 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1302–03 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (granting plaintiff’s 
request for leave to conduct jurisdictional discovery, relying on Eaton v. 
Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 729 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982) and Majd-Pour 
v. Georgiana Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 724 F.2d 901, 903 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
109. GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1351–52 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (reversing district court’s certified interlocutory order 
upholding jurisdiction but remanding for jurisdictional discovery that might 
supplement the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations). 
110. E.g., Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Phencorp Reinsurance 
Co., 440 F.3d 870, 877–78 (7th Cir. 2006) (remanding for jurisdictional 
discovery because the plaintiff made a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction). 
A prima facie requirement as a prerequisite for jurisdictional discovery appears 
odd, however, as a prima facie jurisdictional proof, at least with respect to 
those jurisdictional facts overlapping the merits, is sufficient for the court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction. See Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 
91 Cornell L. Rev. 973, 978 (2006) (“Courts apply the prima facie standard 
either to deny jurisdiction or to uphold it.”). Moreover, despite its ubiquity, 
the “prima facie showing” requirement is notoriously vague and ill-defined. 
See id. at 978–80 (“[I]t is clear that prima facie requires less of a showing 
than that required by the normally prevailing standard of proof, but it is 
unclear how much less.”). 
111. E.g., In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig., 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 
2003) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying an 
opportunity for limited jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiffs pointed 
to a specific meeting attended by representatives of the nonresident defendant 
relevant to the jurisdictional query); Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., 148 F.3d 
181, 185–86 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming the district court’s denial of jurisdictional 
discovery when the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case regarding 
the foreign corporate defendant’s amenability); Lehigh Valley Indus., Inc. v. 
Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 93–94 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding that the district 
court did not abuse its “broad discretion” in denying jurisdictional discovery 
when the plaintiff failed to allege any specific facts regarding the nonresident 
defendant’s forum activity). 
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jurisdictional discovery only when written evidence, rather than specu-
lation or conclusory allegations, support the nonresident defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state; in the absence of supporting documen-
tary evidence, jurisdictional discovery may be freely denied.112 
The third and final approach in the remaining circuits leaves the 
availability of jurisdictional discovery almost entirely to the district 
court’s discretion. This approach is exemplified by the First Circuit, 
which has held that a district court does not abuse its discretion unless 
the plaintiff establishes a colorable jurisdictional claim, the plaintiff 
presents facts showing the materiality of the discovery request, and the 
district court plainly errs to the plaintiff’s substantial prejudice.113 
Other circuits likewise view the availability of jurisdictional discovery 
as committed to the district court’s discretion.114 
Once the district court determines that jurisdictional discovery is 
appropriate, the next difficulty is ascertaining the scope of permissible 
discovery. Here, again, district courts enjoy broad discretion, subject 
only to a few overarching guidelines. In general, the discovery request 
must be specific rather than vague, as with any other discovery re-
quest.115 Additionally, jurisdictional discovery should be narrowed or 
limited to the jurisdictional issues and any merits issues inextricably 
intertwined with jurisdictional issues116—rather than extending to the 
 
112. E.g., Steinbuch v. Cutler, 518 F.3d 580, 589–90 (8th Cir. 2008) (remanding 
for jurisdictional discovery against one defendant on the basis of the plaintiff’s 
production of documentary evidence, while refusing remand against another 
defendant based on the plaintiff’s speculative and conclusory allegations). 
113. E.g., Negrón-Torres v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 478 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 
2007) (affirming the district court’s denial of jurisdictional discovery). 
114. E.g., Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 428–29 (5th Cir. 
2005) (affirming the district court’s refusal to authorize jurisdictional discovery 
when the plaintiffs could not establish prejudice from the denial); Bell 
Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Int’l, Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291, 1299 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that the district court’s jurisdictional discovery denial 
was not an abuse of discretion when the discovery requests were unlikely to 
impact the jurisdictional holding); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, 
Inc., 293 F.3d 707, 715–16 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that further discovery would not aid the 
personal jurisdiction determination). 
115. Cf. Freeman v. United States, 556 F.3d 326, 342–43 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a broad and 
amorphous request for subject-matter jurisdictional discovery). 
116. See Rhodes & Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium, supra note 4, at 255–
58 (explaining that, despite the difficulties with using the merits of a case to 
decide jurisdictional issues, the reality is that “context matters”); Cassandra 
Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 
45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1301, 1329–32 (2012) (“[T]he court cannot merely 
assume that the plaintiff’s jurisdictional allegations are correct.”). 
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substantive merits of the parties’ claims.117 And of course, the discovery 
requests must be relevant to the jurisdictional issue, with the burden 
on the requesting party to establish that the sought discovery is tailored 
to producing the facts necessary to defeat a jurisdictional dismissal mo-
tion.118 But when the necessary facts are uncertain, the relevancy limi-
tation loses much of its meaning. 
C. The New Jurisdictional Discovery Equilibrium 
Even before Daimler, the broad and amorphous nature of the 
governing factors in the jurisdictional calculus rendered the relevancy 
limitation of minimal assistance. Outside of a handful of clear jurisdic-
tional rules that limit the potential scope of accompanying discovery,119 
the jurisdictional query is governed by a mélange of considerations.120 
This led district courts on quite a few occasions, as Professor S.I. Strong 
highlighted, to bless sweeping jurisdictional requests.121 
With the uncertainty after Daimler, the need for broad discovery 
requests has intensified, at a time when the discovery rules are indi-
cating that, in general, the scope of discovery should be curtailed. But 
the procedural rules do not specifically mention jurisdictional discovery, 
and jurisdictional discovery is somewhat sui generis. Many of the speci-
fied factors for the proportionality principle in amended Rule 26(b)(1) 
do not fit well with jurisdictional discovery.122 Some of these factors are 
tailored to the ultimate issues in the case, matters that are generally 
 
117. E.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(ordering limited discovery on the issue of a foreign corporate defendant’s 
business activities in the U.S. when the plaintiff’s jurisdictional discovery 
request was specific and non-frivolous). 
118. Cf. Freeman, 556 F.3d 326, 342–43 (holding that the plaintiffs “failed to 
articulate a discrete discovery request” or to specify the needed likely discover-
able facts to cure the subject-matter jurisdictional deficiency). 
119. See Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming the district court’s denial of discovery regarding a corporate 
subsidiary’s contacts with the forum because those contacts could not make 
the corporation “at home” in the forum for general jurisdiction purposes). 
120. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and 
Personal Jurisdiction, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 567, 626–43 (2007) (discussing the 
various pronounced factors in detail). Professor Richard Freer first used the 
“mélange” description. Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-
First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. Rev. 551, 
552 (2012). 
121. See S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 489, 541–53 (2010) (examining the different facts 
that courts find relevant to questions concerning personal jurisdiction and the 
broad discovery requests that have been employed to unearth those facts). 
122. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 
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inappropriate to consider at the jurisdictional stage, such as “the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the action” and “the amount in contro-
versy.”123 Even the weighing of the benefits and burdens of the proposed 
discovery is somewhat problematic in the jurisdictional context: should 
these benefits and burdens be weighed only with respect to the juris-
dictional issue, or would it be appropriate to consider the benefits to 
the suit writ large in a context where the jurisdictional issue might (as 
it often does) ultimately decide the case? And, of course, the benefits 
of any proposed jurisdictional discovery are hard to ascertain when the 
governing jurisdictional standards are in doubt. 
Jurisdictional discovery also does not fit well within the discovery 
envisioned by the rules because it often must be conducted outside the 
normal discovery time frame. While the 2015 amendments expedite the 
parties’ duty to confer and develop a proposed discovery plan, rendering 
it somewhat more likely that jurisdictional discovery might be 
addressed by the parties and court in the ordinary course, the motion 
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction still might be ruled upon before the 
discovery plan trigger. Under the new rules, the discovery conference 
has been advanced thirty (30) days: the parties must now confer no 
later than sixty-nine (69) days after any defendant has been served or 
thirty-nine (39) days after any defendant has appeared.124 While the 
parties may confer before the deadline, which would be beneficial if a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction has been filed, this 
opportunity requires the cooperation of opposing counsel.125 Thus, it 
will largely be up to the courts and the parties to fashion jurisdictional 
discovery. 
In doing so, the courts must be cognizant of the uncertainties that 
plaintiffs face in establishing jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 
Although a balance is needed between the rights of plaintiffs and defen-
dants with respect to jurisdictional discovery, broad discovery may be 
necessary now to give plaintiffs some opportunity to present evidence 
on new jurisdictional theories in an attempt to satisfy an uncertain 
governing standard. District courts are in the best place to make this 
determination on a case-by-case basis. Although this does not provide 
the certainty and predictability craved by business, the upheaval of 
 
123. Id. 
124. The 2015 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(2) moved 
the deadline for issuing the scheduling order up thirty (30) days, to no later 
than ninety (90) days after any defendant has been served with the complaint 
or sixty (60) days after any defendant has appeared. Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(f), which requires that the parties must confer at least twenty-
one (21) days before the scheduling order is due, was not amended. 
125. See Amii N. Castle, A Comprehensive Overview: 2015 Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 837, 858 (2016) (stating 
that a primary goal of the 2015 amendments was to achieve “a heightened 
level of cooperation between the parties and opposing counsel”). 
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jurisdictional doctrine wrought by Daimler will have both positive and 
negative impacts on their interests. 
Conclusion 
Through four cases in less than four years, the Roberts Court has 
significantly reshaped the contours of personal jurisdiction. Although 
the changes limit the scope of jurisdiction in ways that may favor defen-
dants overall, the Court did not appear directly motivated by a desire 
to favor business—and, in fact, the Court erected significant obstacles 
to business interests. Instead, the results in the cases may be better 
explained by the Court’s commitment to a formalist approach with res-
pect for territorial boundaries and by a skepticism of transnational liti-
gation not clearly related to a U.S. forum. 
The Court’s recent changes to the discovery rules suggest that its 
rulemaking approach, in contrast, may align more directly with busi-
ness interests. Chief Justice Roberts’ report summarizing the new rules 
parallels the language used by business advocates who focus on the 
expense of lawsuits and the toll that litigation takes on business.126 In 
the report, he writes that the discovery changes are important “to help 
ensure that federal court litigation does not degenerate into wasteful 
clashes over matters that have little to do with achieving a just 
result.”127 The Court’s more business-protective approach to discovery 
does not undercut the Court’s formalist commitment, but rather likely 
reflects a continued regard for the separation of powers even in the 
Court itself, where the rulemaking function can more directly encom-
pass policy interests than the Court’s adjudication function.128 
While the revised discovery rules may lessen litigation costs overall, 
however, they do not take account of the need for jurisdictional discov-
ery and do not help resolve the jurisdictional analysis. This oversight is 
unfortunate, as the Court’s new equilibrium in personal jurisdiction 
means that factual development will become increasingly important. It 
is no longer enough to say that a defendant has continuous, systematic, 
and substantial contacts within the forum; instead, parties will have to 
develop a factual foundation that explores the nature, scope, extent, 
and duration of those contacts and explains how those contacts relate 
to the substance of the claim asserted. Without further refinement of 
 
126. See generally Beisner, supra note 42 (expressing concern about discovery 
costs). 
127. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., supra note 97, at 12.  
128. See Wasserman, supra note 2, at 333 (“The early years of the Roberts Court 
have been marked by a great deal of procedural rulemaking outside of Supreme 
Court adjudication—by Congress, by all the actors in the REA process, and 
by lower courts, all often coming in response to the Court’s adjudicative 
activity.”). 
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the rules of jurisdictional discovery, courts and parties alike will strug-
gle to reconcile the jurisdictional question with the available tools of 
discovery. 
